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Abstract
This paper explores the link between legal status and transnational engagement
through the lenses of territorial confinement and blocked transnationalism. We
hypothesize that irregular legal status results both in direct territorial confinement—an
inability to visit the homeland—and in indirect caging of remitting, an important
non-mobile transnational activity. This caging is hypothesized to result from an
attenuation of social ties associated with reduced physical co-presence with kin and
other important individuals in the homeland. Using longitudinal data on Senegalese
migrants in France, Italy, and Spain from the MAFE Project, we find that Senegalese
migrants who lack of secure legal status are effectively confined to the destination
territory, preventing them from making short visits to the homeland. The direct and
indirect relationships between irregular status and remittances, though, vary by
destination country: the hypothesized relationships are not evident for migrants in
Spain, indicating the role played by other facets of the context of reception, such as
policy tolerance and the characteristics of the co-ethnic community.
Keywords: Legal status, Irregularity, Transnational activities, Remittances, Circulation
Introduction
Migrants have long maintained ongoing social, economic, and political connections
with their homelands, but these transnational activities have garnered increased atten-
tion from scholars and policymakers since the 1990s. Academic research has shown
that modern travel and communications technologies have created new kinds and
quantities of transnational engagement, findings which have challenged the notions of
the state control of borders and of unidirectional immigrant settlement and assimila-
tion. International development agencies and destination-country governments, espe-
cially in Europe, have begun to recognize the potential of transnationally engaged
migrants to be active participants in the development of their home communities.
Such “co-development” strategies seek to leverage migrant cross-border activities, such
as remittances, investment, and participation in hometown associations, as part of
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overall development strategies. At the same time, migration policies in Western
European countries have tended to constrain more and more heavily the possibilities
for migrants to stay and work legally, and thus produce a growing population of irregu-
lar migrants (Triandafyllidou, 2010).
In this paper, we show that these two policy orientations (co-development and migra-
tion restrictions) are paradoxical, if not contradictory, by studying the constraint that
irregular legal status may place on cross-border engagement. Our quantitative approach
distinguishes between mobile transnational activities, i.e. visits to the homeland, and
non-mobile activities, such as remitting. Many studies recognize occasional physical
visits to the homeland to be an important component of the transnational social field,
both as an important link between destination and origin in its own right and as a cru-
cial way to maintain the social links that sustain non-mobile activities such as remit-
ting. Yet most research does not consider the direct constraint on physical mobility
faced by migrants without secure legal status or the effect that such reduction in mobil-
ity might have for non-mobile, long-distance activities.
This paper explores the link between legal status and transnational engagement
through the lenses of territorial confinement and blocked transnationalism. We
hypothesize that irregular legal status results both in direct territorial confinement—an
inability to visit the homeland—and in indirect caging of remitting, an important non-
mobile transnational activity. This caging is hypothesized to result from the attenuation
of social ties and social obligations associated with reduced physical co-presence with
kin and other important individuals in the homeland from which migrants often draw
their sense of status.
The Migrations between Africa and Europe (MAFE) survey of Senegalese migrants in
France, Italy, and Spain provides the empirical data on which these hypotheses are
tested. Senegalese migrants are renowned in the qualitative literature for practicing
“transnational livelihoods” predicated on circulation between the destination and the
homeland and the accumulation of material wealth and social status in Senegal in prep-
aration for an eventual return. At the same time, Senegalese migrants often lack secure
legal status: those without “papers” are often “stuck” in the destination country and
may thus face challenges in constructing a transnational existence. Thus the develop-
ment potential of this group of migrants—courted by the French and Spanish govern-
ments and coveted by the Senegalese state—may be short circuited by lack of secure
legal status. Interestingly, the MAFE survey offers the possibility to test the validity of
our hypotheses in multiple contexts of reception, i.e. France, Italy, and Spain. The
immigration-policy contexts in these three countries have varied over time, creating
multiple configurations of legal statuses among Senegalese migrants.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature on trans-
national activities and argues that state immigration-control policies create irregular
legal statuses that have both direct and indirect effects on both mobile and non-mobile
transnational activities. We then review the data and methods, highlighting the advan-
tages of MAFE’s longitudinal data on both transnational activities and legal statuses
and the models we use to estimate direct and indirect effects. The results of these
models show that Senegalese migrants are territorially confined by irregular legal status,
limiting their ability to visit their homeland. The effects on remitting, however, are
more complicated and not only depend directly and indirectly on legal status but also
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vary by destination. The final sections discuss these results, with an emphasis on why
the effects of legal status vary by national context, and conclude with implications of
the findings for policies of immigration control and co-development.
Literature review
This section reviews the literature on the role of the state in migrants’ transnational ac-
tivities, arguing that immigration-control policies may constrain cross-border action.
We examine how irregular legal status could limit transnational activities by consider-
ing the direct effects of irregularity on both mobile transnational activities, such as
visits to the homeland, and non-mobile transnational activities, such as remitting. We
then argue that there may be a relationship between visits to the homeland and non-
mobile transnational activities, based on the maintenance of social ties; this relationship
may then transmit an indirect effect of irregular legal status on remitting through legal
constraints on circulation. Finally, we present our hypotheses and the empirical case of
Senegalese migrants in Europe.
The role of the state in migrants’ transnational activities
Following Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt’s (1999) call to delimit and measure the
phenomenon of transnationalism empirically, the 2000s have seen a flowering of studies
of a myriad of kinds of transnational activities among a wide variety of groups (for a
review, see Levitt & Jaworsky, 2007). Many studies have shown that individual charac-
teristics such as age, education, occupation, and length of residence in the host com-
munity are associated with a variety of transnational activities (Guarnizo, 2003;
Guarnizo, Portes, & Haller, 2003; Itzigsohn & Saucedo, 2002). What has been underem-
phasized in this literature, however, is how state immigration-control apparatuses and
the legal statuses they produce may also structure transnational activities. Given the
widespread acknowledgement of the preponderant role that legal status plays in the in-
corporation of migrants in the destination society (Massey, 2007; Portes & Rumbaut,
2006), it is surprising that scholars have not paid more attention to the impact that
legal status may have on the transnational activities that have been shown to accom-
pany such integration.
This underemphasis may be due, in part, to a tension in the transnational-studies lit-
erature regarding the conceptualization of the role of the state. Much of the early litera-
ture on migrant transnational activities focused on the challenge that these activities
posed to national borders. Transnational activities explicitly take place across borders
and seemingly despite state attempts at control, indicating a weakness or even an in-
ability of the state to control flows of people, money, ideas, and values (Glick Schiller,
Basch, & Blanc, 1995).
In this view, the state and its territorial border—and the national membership that
this frontier implies—have difficulty containing the globe-spanning networks that
“transmigrants” construct via their incessant physical, social, and economic connections
to the homeland. These connections, it is argued, are possible mainly because of
technological advances in travel and communications that compress time and space:
jumbo jets make formerly insurmountable distances between destination and origin
easily traveled, and mobile phones and the internet allow migrants to be in daily touch
with their families in the homeland (Diminescu, 2008; Vertovec, 2003). While
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subsequent research has questioned the argument that cross-border engagement is a
novel form of social action (Foner, 1997) and has nuanced the depiction of the fluidity
of transnational life (Levitt & Jaworsky, 2007), new technologies have undoubtedly
made transnational activities easier and cheaper, and have thus had an impact on the
quantity and kinds of cross-border engagement (Diminescu, 2008; Portes, Guarnizo, &
Haller, 2002).
Other research has argued for the importance of the state in the study of trans-
national activities. Waldinger (2008, 2010, 2015) argues that international migrants
have and will always participate in these kind of cross-border activities; what is missing
from the account, he argues, is analysis of the ability of the state and its borders to
bound both identificational and territorial belonging. First, the identificational demands
of modern nation-states encourage legally resident migrants with an initially trans-
national orientation to abandon it in favor of identification with the destination polity,
leading to “societal divergence” (Waldinger, 2015). Second, states and their efforts to
control borders can act to “cage” migrants, both through processes of settlement and
territorial confinement. State efforts to control movement across borders effectively
confine irregular migrants to the territory of the destination country; this constraint on
physical mobility entails the progressive attenuation of the social ties that nourish
cross-border engagement (Waldinger, 2008, 2015). Waldinger (2008) describes this
process as “double capture” in which the destination state constrains the cross-border
engagement of both documented and undocumented migrants.
Critiques of Waldinger’s approach have questioned the centrality and influence he ac-
cords to the state, as well as his depiction of the withering of social ties underlying
transnationalism. Schiller (2015) agrees that the state is an important element in power
relations structuring transnationalism, but argues that a multiscalar global perspective
situates the locus of power in global capitalism and not the state. Levitt (2015) argues
that the social ties underlying transnationalism are more durable than Waldinger’s depic-
tion and questions the power of the state to undermine them. Itzigsohn (2015) contends
that Waldinger is too uncritical in his depiction of societal divergence, and argues that the
process of incorporation may need to new forms of exclusion that reignite the connection
between immigrants or their descendants and their homelands. Critics also contend that
Waldinger’s focus on Latin American migrants in the US may bias his findings by not
considering other contexts of receptions and types of migrants (Levitt, 2015).
These critiques point out important limitations in Waldinger’s (2015) efforts to
explain the constraints on transnationalism, but they also recognize the contribution of
an approach that seeks to understand the variation in transnational practices. As Levitt
notes, a crucial challenge for the study of transnationalism is to “…explain why ties and
engagements persist, attenuate, or fade away” and to research “…how, why and where
transnational practices remain strong over time and for whom – what patterns emerge,
what classes of people stand out, and what kinds of governance structures encourage
or dampen transnational livelihoods” (pp. 2283–2284). Waldinger’s contribution is to
further this effort by examining patterns of transnational practices and offering
explanations for the “how, why and where” that Levitt calls for. His explanation is
rooted in the ability of the state to police its borders and ensure social closure in ways
that impinge upon the ability of migrants to maintain social ties with those at home
and engage in transnational activities.
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Territorial confinement of migrants with irregular legal status
How does the legal reality of the state, its borders, and the concomitant legal
statuses—which the research reviewed above contends exert a powerful influence on
transnational activities—actually constrain the cross-border actions of migrants? The
answer to that question depends, in part, on the action under consideration. Some
transnational activities may be more sensitive to legal constraints than others, especially
those that depend in some way on migrants having a secure legal status in the destin-
ation society. The most relevant example is travel between destination and origin.
Dunn (2010, p. 5) notes that crossing national borders “is not so free and easy”: while
international travel is certainly much cheaper and quicker in the contemporary world
than before, destination states remain capable of restricting movements across their
borders. Despite some early exaggerations of mobility, research on transnationalism has
underscored this continued power of borders (Dunn, 2010). As Waldinger (2008)
points out, migrants do not come and go as they please, but only engage in physical
cross-border mobility to the extent that states allow it, and scholars have begun calling
for approaches to transnationalism that grapple with the political and legal constraints
on mobility (Boccagni, 2012b; Mountz, Wright, Miyares, & Bailey, 2002).
Legal status is clearly the key factor in allowing migrants to travel freely between
destination and their home communities: those migrants who lack secure legal status
are less likely to engage in this kind of physical circulation because they are not guaran-
teed re-entry and do not want to risk the cost and potential danger of an unauthorized
entry (Massey, Durand, & Malone, 2002). Empirical research demonstrates the relation-
ship between legal status and circulation. Kaag (2008) finds that Senegalese migrants in
Italy without “papers” describe themselves as being “stuck” because they do not want to
expose themselves to the cost and risk of an additional irregular passage. Waldinger
(2008) finds that homeland visits are the most common form of cross-border activity
among his sample of Colombians, Cubans, Dominicans, and Salvadorans, and he also
finds that secure legal status strongly predicts the probability of travel home. Immigra-
tion policies are thus a crucial conditioning factor for this form of cross-border engage-
ment: migrants who lack secure legal status experience a “territorial confinement”
(Waldinger, 2008) that constrains their movement across national borders. We thus
hypothesize a direct negative effect of irregular legal status on migrants’ propensity to
return home for short visits because of the legal barrier to mobility inherent in irregular
status.
Structural exclusion and blocked transnationalism
While the constraint that irregular legal status places on physical circulation between
destination and origin is unambiguous, the legal constraint of this status on other
transnational activities is less clear. Why would, for instance, irregular legal status
constrain remittances, a transnational activity that does not necessarily involve the
migrant’s physical crossing of a border? The literature suggests a mechanism: migrants
with an irregular status are in a situation of structural exclusion, which, in turn, blocks
their ability to perform cross-border activities (Bloch, 2008; Mazzucato, 2008; Van
Meeteren, 2012). Lack of regular legal status can, for example, prevent migrants from
participating in the formal labor market, relegating them to informal, precarious, and
low-paid jobs; this insecurity could make them less likely to have the means to remit.
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Lack of regular legal status could also constrain participation in various financial insti-
tutions: not having a bank account or not being able to access credit could reduce mi-
grants’ abilities to send remittances to and invest in assets at home, for example. We
thus hypothesize a mechanism of blocked transnationalism that would manifest itself
by a direct negative effect of irregular legal statuses on remitting because of the struc-
tural exclusion it engenders.
Social ties to home and non-mobile transnational activities
The territorial confinement and structural exclusion hypotheses both posit a negative
effect of irregular legal statuses on migrants’ cross-border activities: irregular status
simultaneously constrains migrants’ abilities to cross the destination state’s borders (a
mobile transnational activity) and to participate in formal institutions that allow them
to engage in other forms of cross-border engagement, especially through remittances (a
non-mobile transnational activity). Beyond these independent effects of legal status on
either mobile or non-mobile transnational activities, the literature suggests a potential
relationship between physical mobility and transnational activities: occasional physical
border-crossing may nurture social relationships—affective ties, but also social
obligations—that fuel cross-border engagement (Guarnizo et al., 2003; Itzigsohn &
Saucedo, 2002). If lack of secure legal status constrains visits to the homeland, this
constraint could be transmitted to long-distance, non-mobile activities by the
weakening of social ties.
What is it about visits home that might encourage other kinds of transnational en-
gagement? Some studies of transnationalism have asserted that advances in communi-
cations technologies have helped migrants transcend the physical distance to their
friends and family in the homeland and create “a perception of intimate connectedness”
with them (Wilding, 2006, p. 138). Virtual co-presence, in this view, substitutes effect-
ively for, and may even surpass, physical co-presence in nourishing the social links that
motivate and sustain regular cross-border social engagement (Diminescu, 2008). While
scholars of mobility have recognized the potential for communications technologies to
compress space and time in novel ways, there is still some doubt about the ability of
virtual communication to replace physical face-to-face interactions (Boccagni, 2012a).
Mobility research has found, for example, that interactions involving physical co-
presence are necessary for developing extended relations of trust (Urry, 2002). Indeed,
even communications at a distance, while allowing some maintenance of social ties,
may actually increase the need to reinvigorate these relationships via occasional
physical co-presence (Boccagni, 2012a; Urry, 2002). Physical visits to the homeland
may thus allow migrants to build and renew the trust and emotional identification that
underlie long-distance social ties. Furthermore, research has shown that transnational
activities are embedded in a web of family-based obligations (Menjivar, DaVanzo,
Greenwell, & Valdez, 1998) and moral economies (Carling, 2008). There is evidence
that visits to family and physical co-presence with them “have the potential to consoli-
date relationships of reciprocity” (Baldassar, 2008, p. 263) and thus reinscribe migrants
in the family-based moral economy in ways that may encourage non-mobile trans-
national activities upon return to the destination.
Other studies of transnationalism suggest that physical circulation between destination
and origin is important in facilitating other transnational activities in instrumental, rather
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than affective, ways. Visits allow migrants to gather first-hand information on the well-
being of their families, the suitability of business opportunities and partners, and the over-
all socioeconomic conditions of their communities (Carling, 2008) and could thus inform
decisions to send money, invest in assets, and participate in collective development ef-
forts. Riccio (2001) argues that visits home are crucial for the transnational livelihoods of
Senegalese migrants in Italy, which involve frequent trips back to Senegal to facilitate in-
vestments and other business dealings. Research often assumes the importance of cross-
border travel for other transnational activities but leaves it unanalyzed. Portes and associ-
ates (Portes et al., 2002; Portes & Zhou, 2012) assert that transnational entrepreneurship
is at least partially dependent on the ability to be physically present both “here”
and “there,” but the actual practice of short visits to the homeland is not included
as a predictor variable in models. Waldinger (2008) analyzes the regularity and re-
cency of home-country travel, but does not directly examine its effect on other
cross-border activities.
Occasional physical presence in the homeland is thus of clear importance for the
maintenance of social ties, the renewal of family obligations in the transnational moral
economy, and the instrumental gathering of information, which are themselves the
crucial social infrastructure of transnational flows. We thus hypothesize a positive direct
effect of short returns (visits) on non-mobile transnational activities, such as remitting.
Indirect caging of non-mobile transnational activities
A relationship between short visits to the origin community and other transnational ac-
tivities opens the door to the possibility of an indirect effect of irregular legal statuses
on non-mobile transnational activities. Waldinger (2008, 2015) argues that states effect-
ively “cage” migrants with irregular legal status by constraining their movement across
borders. This caging not only limits migrants’ physical movement but also, by limiting
physical co-presence with important people “back home,” constrains their social ties to
the homeland. Short returns home thus act as a mediator of irregular legal statuses. If
migrants with irregular legal status experience territorial confinement that constrains
their ability to circulate, and if short visits to the homeland allow migrants to maintain
social ties and gather information, and if these ties and information encourage migrants
to participate in other forms of cross-border action, then migrants with irregular legal
status should participate less in those forms of cross-border action that depend in some
way on at least occasional physical presence in the homeland.
While the literature is suggestive of this indirect effect of irregular legal status on
non-mobile transnational activities, few studies have simultaneously examined either
the direct relationship between short returns and non-mobile transnational activities or
the indirect relationship between irregular legal status and non-mobile transnational
activities transmitted via inhibited cross-border mobility. Waldinger (2008, p. 24) notes
that “better settled migrants with secure legal status are more likely to engage in activ-
ities requiring physical presence in the homeland,” but he does not examine the impact
that migrants’ legal status has on both physical presence in the homeland and the activ-
ities that require such presence. Carling (2008) points out that migrants who do not
visit home cannot directly observe whether their families use remittances as intended.
We thus hypothesize that irregular legal status will indirectly constrain non-mobile
transnational activities. Migrants who do not have the ability to circulate between
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destination and origin because of their irregular legal status are effectively prevented
from engaging in transnational livelihoods that depend on this circulation.
Framework of hypotheses
Figure 1 summarizes the hypothesized relationships between irregular legal status and
Senegalese migrants’ cross-border engagement. The territorial confinement hypothesis
(H1) posits a direct legal constraint of irregular status on migrants’ short returns to
Senegal. The structural exclusion (H2) hypothesis postulates a direct legal constraint of
irregular status on migrants’ abilities to participate in formal institutions that may
promote non-mobile cross-border engagement; irregular status is thus a proxy for
unmeasured blockages of participation in such institutions. The social ties (H3) hy-
pothesis suggests a link between short returns and non-mobile transnational en-
gagement via the maintenance of social links and obligations and the ability to
gather first-hand information through occasional physical presence in the home-
land. Finally, the caging hypothesis (H4) posits that the territorial confinement of
migrants with irregular statuses (H1) constrains social ties with the homeland (H3)
in a way that dampens non-mobile cross-border engagement. Irregular legal status
thus constrains cross-border action in a multitude of direct and indirect ways that
depend, in part, on the crossing of physical and institutional borders.
The empirical case
To test this set of hypotheses we study the case of Senegalese migration in Europe in
three different countries, namely France, Italy and Spain. This case is interesting for at
least two reasons: first, Senegalese migrants are known for the intensity of their trans-
national connections and, second, Senegalese migrants’ three main destination coun-
tries in Europe offer quite varied contexts of reception.
Senegalese migrants in Europe and across the globe have been noted for their regular
and sustained participation in the lives of the kin and communities they left behind in
their homeland. Studies of Senegalese migrants have argued that they live their lives
across borders in multiple places simultaneously and that the dominant mode of
organization of their migration experience is transnational (Kane, 2011) with an over-
riding goal of creating economic, social, and spiritual lives in Senegal to which they
hope to return (Riccio, 2008). Indeed, Senegalese are quite active in a number of trans-
national spheres, with remittances playing a large role. Official monetary remittances to
Fig. 1 Theoretical model
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Senegal almost tripled between 2002 and 2010, rising from $305 million to $1.16 bil-
lion, or about 10 % of GDP (Cisse, 2011). In terms of the absolute value of remittance
flows, Senegal ranks fourth in sub-Saharan Africa, behind only demographic giants
Nigeria, Kenya, and Sudan, while it ranks fourth in remittances as a percentage of GDP
behind the much smaller countries of Lesotho, Togo, Cape Verde, and Guinea-Bissau
(Cisse, 2011). In addition, official remittances are thought to make up only 54 % of total
remittances (Sarr, 2009).
Short visits to Senegal by migrants residing abroad are an integral part of what Kaag
(2008) calls a “circular transnational livelihood,” facilitating trade and other economic
transactions (Riccio, 2008). Quantitative work on Senegalese migration has shown that
Senegalese are more likely than other groups (namely Ghanaians or Congolese) to
make visits to their home country: half of Senegalese migrants visit Senegal within five
years of departure, while only a third of Ghanaians and 10 % of Congolese do so
(Schoumaker et al., 2013). Their families also tend to be transnational: family reunifica-
tion is lower among Senegalese migrants than among other African migrants in
Europe, with spouses commonly remaining in Senegal (Beauchemin et al., 2015;
Mazzucato, Schans, Caarls, & Beauchemin, 2015). Senegalese migrants thus participate
in a wide variety of transnational activities, lending credence to the assertion that they
organize their migration strategies along transnational lines.
Despite this transnational way of life, qualitative studies have also demonstrated that
Senegalese migrants’ cross-border activities are constrained by their lack of secure legal
status (Kaag, 2008; Kane, 2011). Riccio (2001, 2008) highlights the important role that
acquisition of the permesso di soggiorno plays for Senegalese migrants in Italy: without
it, they are not able to practice the circular transnational livelihoods that purportedly
mark the Senegalese migration experience. The legal constraint is all the more import-
ant given the often precarious administrative situations in which Senegalese migrants
in Europe find themselves (Vickstrom, 2014). Senegalese have long been suspected of
participating in “clandestine” or irregular migration strategies in Europe. Senegalese mi-
grants were often seen as “false tourists” in France during the late 1960s (Diop, 1993;
Spire, 2005) and were publicly visible in the sans papiers movement in the 1990s
(Timera, 1997). In Italy and Spain, they remain among the nationalities with the highest
rates of irregularity (UNODC, 2013). Research has also demonstrated that variation in
these three countries’ immigration policies has created different configurations of ir-
regularity among Senegalese migrants (Vickstrom, 2014).
Given both the deep transnational involvement and the varied contexts of reception
and configurations of legal statuses of Senegalese migrants in Europe, we must ask how
the direct and indirect relationships between irregular legal status and transnational ac-
tivities described above might vary across these destinations. We offer two hypotheses
that suggest that these effects depend not only on destination, but also type of trans-
national activity. First, we expect the legal constraint of irregular legal status on visits
home to be similar across destinations. Given the increasing restrictiveness of
immigration-control policies in the three countries over time, especially in regards to
border crossings, we expect all three contexts are thus similarly confining for those mi-
grants lacking legal status. Second, we expect the direct and indirect effects of irregular
status on remitting to vary with the context of reception. As there is no firm legal con-
straint of irregular status on this activity, the direct and indirect effects, or lack thereof,
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will reflect factors such as hostility or tolerance of immigration policies, the risk of de-
portation, and the presence and composition of co-ethnic social networks.
Data and methods
Longitudinal data from the MAFE Project
The analyses performed in this paper rely on data from the Migration between Africa
and Europe (MAFE-Senegal) Project (Beauchemin, 2015),1 which conducted retrospect-
ive life-history interviews with samples of Senegalese migrants in France, Italy, and
Spain. The project randomly selected Senegalese migrants from municipal registers
(Padrón) in Spain, and used quota methods with a variety of recruitment methods in
other destination countries (Beauchemin, 2015). The multi-sited character of the MAFE
data (both at origin and destination with comparative data) allows inclusion in the ana-
lyses of individuals who have returned to Senegal after a stay in Europe and thus avoids
potential biases in the retrospective measurement of transnational activities. Further-
more, the inclusion of three different countries (France, Italy and Spain) permits study
of the extent to which transnational practices vary or not according to the context of
reception. Longitudinal and time-varying analyses, which are important as both legal
status and transnational participation are likely to vary from year to year over a mi-
grant’s stay at destination, are possible thanks to the retrospective nature of the data.
The life-history interview elicited a wide range of information about individual mi-
grants for each year between birth and 2008. The questionnaire included modules on
legal status and transnational activities for those years that the migrant spent outside of
Senegal. The analytic sample includes all person-years during which an individual was
a migrant in France, Italy, or Spain, including person-years contributed by return mi-
grants in Senegal who spent time in one or more of the three European countries. Mi-
grants interviewed in any of the European countries may also contribute person-years
to the analysis of other countries if they previously spent time in those countries (i.e.,
migrants can have more than one trip). The total analytic sample comprises 658 indi-
viduals contributing 8,188 person years. The French subsample contained 264 individ-
uals and 3,677 person-years, the Italian subsample contained 200 individuals
contributing 2,413 person-years, and the Spanish subsample comprised 198 individuals
and 2,098 person years.
Outcome and predictor variables
The MAFE project collected individual life histories in a comparative fashion in all
countries. It provides detailed retrospective information on some transnational
activities, including short returns to Senegal and remittances—the outcomes of our
analyses—and also a wide range of variables that influence cross-border connections,
including the migrants’ legal status, the main variable of interest in our analyses.
The outcome variables (visiting and remitting) are dichotomous. They are coded “1”
each time the transnational activity is observed, “0” otherwise. For visits, the variable
indicates when migrants returned to Senegal for less than one year without the
intention of staying there. For remittances, the interviewer asked if the individual regu-
larly sent money to someone who lived in a different country, and, if so, during which
periods and to which country. The corresponding variable is coded “1” for each year in
which a migrant reported sending money to someone living in Senegal.
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The main predictor variable of interest in our analysis is legal status, which was self-
reported by individuals for each year lived outside of Senegal. In this paper, we use two
distinct variables. One refers to the time of entry in Europe and indicates whether the
individual entered with or without a visa. The other is a composite categorical time-
varying variable indicating the work and residential legal status in each year during the
migrant’s residence in Europe. Four categories are distinguished that combine the two
types of permits (work and residence): RP_WP (“fully regular status”), NRP_WP
(“mixed status, no residence permit”), RP_NWP (“mixed status, no work permit”),
NRP_NWP (“fully irregular status”). Distinguishing between work and residence
permits was a way to allow for the collection of legal status histories in all sorts of
contexts (all countries where migrants lived, whatever the period). Mixed statuse-
s—having one kind of authorization but not the other—are theoretically possible. In
France, for instance, asylum seekers are not allowed to work,2 and the same restriction
has applied to reunified spouses in Spain (González-Ferrer, 2011). It is worth mention-
ing, however, that migrants experience a mixed status quite infrequently—less than 4 %
of person-years—and most likely as a result of somewhat rare dysfunctions in the
receiving states’ immigration-control bureaucracies, or simply as the result of poor
recall on the part of migrants. A focus will thus be given to clear-cut statuses when
interpreting the results.
Other explanatory variables that are commonly expected to influence the probability
to engage in transnational activities are included in the models. Contextual variables in-
clude the destination country and the period of arrival in Europe. Other variables are
related to individuals’ characteristics and to their social environment. They give insights
on socio-demographic characteristics (years of education, sex, and age), economic
conditions (employment status and self-reported well-being), conditions of migration
(number of years since arrival,3 age at migration, number of previous migrations to
Europe), social networks at destination, and social context of exit (place of origin,
ethnicity, religion, familial connections with individuals in Senegal, father’s schooling as
a measure of the socioeconomic status of the sending family).
Estimating direct effects
To take into account both the multi-variate determination of cross-border connections
and the ordering of events, we estimated two series of models: (a) a visit to Senegal and
(b) sending remittances. In both cases, logit models were run first for all migrants,
whatever their destination (pooled models), and second by destination. A person-
specific random intercept was introduced in the models to take into account repeated
observations at the individual level, to capture unobserved heterogeneity in the propen-
sity to engage in the outcome, and to minimize endogeneity bias from omitted variables
(Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008). The model can be written as
logit Pr yit ¼ 1 j xit ; ζ ið Þf g ¼ β1 þ x′iβ2 þ x′itβ3 þ ζ i
where yit is the dichotomous outcome indicator of participation in a given transnational
activity (either visiting or remitting) for person i during year t, β1 is a constant, x′i is a
vector of time-constant explanatory variables, x′it is a vector of time-varying explanatory
variables (including the legal status, see details above),4 β2 and β3 are regression coeffi-
cients, and ζi is the person-specific random intercept, assumed to be independent
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across respondents i. Estimates were produced using Stata version 12’s xtlogit com-
mand, which employs adaptive Gauss-Hermite quadrature to approximate the likeli-
hood function (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008). Sensitivity tests indicated forty-eight
quadrature points were appropriate for fitting the models accurately.
For these multivariate models, results are displayed as average marginal effects
(AMEs). AMEs are useful for the interpretation of non-linear models and capture the
expected change in the probability of the outcome associated with a one-unit or
discrete change in a predictor variable (see Cameron & Trivedi, 2010 for more informa-
tion on average marginal effects). Mood (2010) argues that AMEs are appropriate for
non-linear model comparisons, which is helpful when comparing the effect of a given
variable across different models. For these random-effects models, AMEs are calculated
assuming that the group-specific intercept is set at the mean of the distribution of the
random intercepts (i.e., zero). It is also useful to note that the results are subject-
specific probabilities, and not population-average probabilities: they refer to the yearly
individual probability of engaging in each transnational activity.
Estimating indirect effects in a non-linear framework
The caging hypothesis posits an indirect effect of legal statuses on non-mobile
transnational activities via the mediating variable of short returns. Estimation of this
indirect effect is straightforward in a linear regression model: the difference in the
coefficients for the legal-status variables in models with (the “reduced model”) and
without (the “full model”) the mediator variable can be considered the indirect effect of
that variable. In a non-linear framework, however, the underlying latent outcome
variable has a scale that is unknown and depends on the predictors included in the
model, and thus calculating indirect effects in nonlinear models using techniques
developed for linear regression conflates rescaling with mediation (Kohler, Karlson, &
Holm, 2011; Mood, 2010). Kohler, Karlson, and Holm propose a method (hereafter,
“KHB method”) for effect decomposition in a non-linear framework (Karlson & Holm,
2011). They propose extracting the information that is not contained in the predictor
variable of interest from the mediator by calculating the residuals of a regression of the
mediator on the predictor variable of interest and using the residuals of this regression,
which have the same standard deviation as the mediator variable itself and thus induce
the same scale for the coefficients, in the reduced model. The KHB method will
allow the calculation of the indirect effects of legal statuses on non-mobile trans-




Descriptive results provide support for the first two hypotheses. Migrants with irregular
statuses return home less frequently, indicating that territorial confinement accompan-
ies these irregular statuses. Migrants with irregular statuses remit less, indicating that
their lack of secure legal status directly blocks them from cross-border action (Table 1).
Indeed, across destinations, migrants with both a residence and a work permit
(RP_WP) report short returns to Senegal in 39 % to 43 % of person-years, against 3 %
to 8 % for those without any permit (NRP_NWP). Migrants with only residence
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics for MAFE-Senegal sample, by destination and legal status

























mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
Short returns 0.03 0.17 0.17 0.37 0.17 0.38 0.39 0.49 0.03 0.17 0.36 0.49 0.22 0.42 0.31 0.46 0.08 0.27 0.28 0.45 0.25 0.43 0.43 0.50
Remitting to Senegal 0.51 0.50 0.72 0.45 0.51 0.50 0.76 0.43 0.68 0.47 0.68 0.48 0.57 0.50 0.78 0.41 0.50 0.50 0.84 0.37 0.70 0.46 0.81 0.40
Entry status: no visa 0.37 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.48 0.35 0.48 0.59 0.49 0.20 0.41 0.39 0.49 0.34 0.47 0.54 0.50 0.23 0.43 0.79 0.41 0.60 0.49
Years in destination 4.88 3.98 10.50 8.02 9.65 9.16 12.50 9.30 2.53 1.72 3.90 2.26 6.51 5.47 7.60 5.28 3.80 3.76 6.56 5.04 7.84 5.68 9.13 5.56
Period of arrival: post-1990 0.57 0.50 0.15 0.35 0.37 0.48 0.34 0.47 0.93 0.25 1.00 0.00 0.80 0.40 0.79 0.41 0.82 0.39 0.83 0.38 0.72 0.45 0.66 0.47
Age at start of current migration spell 26.10 9.14 26.20 6.25 28.40 7.28 26.70 7.12 28.40 7.24 27.50 5.69 27.80 6.40 28.10 6.89 27.70 5.64 27.00 4.65 26.50 5.18 26.30 5.74
Sex: Male 0.52 0.50 0.72 0.45 0.56 0.50 0.60 0.49 0.87 0.33 0.75 0.44 0.46 0.50 0.82 0.39 0.86 0.35 0.92 0.27 0.83 0.38 0.94 0.24
Years of education 9.56 6.56 6.71 7.18 9.27 7.98 9.81 6.72 5.43 4.94 2.37 4.01 5.12 5.78 7.24 5.19 9.05 4.23 10.40 3.76 9.01 5.08 10.50 4.45
Ethnicity: Wolof 0.35 0.48 0.42 0.50 0.39 0.49 0.26 0.44 0.67 0.47 0.04 0.21 0.47 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.79 0.41 0.75 0.44 0.74 0.44 0.85 0.36
Religion: Mouride 0.41 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.16 0.37 0.15 0.36 0.35 0.48 0.23 0.43 0.48 0.50 0.36 0.48 0.75 0.43 0.61 0.49 0.61 0.49 0.66 0.47
Unemployed 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.17 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.28 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.18 0.10 0.29 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.11
Employed 0.64 0.48 0.90 0.31 0.69 0.46 0.77 0.42 0.88 0.32 0.79 0.42 0.52 0.50 0.94 0.24 0.89 0.32 0.97 0.16 0.83 0.38 0.97 0.16
Inactive 0.34 0.48 0.09 0.29 0.30 0.46 0.20 0.40 0.06 0.23 0.13 0.34 0.46 0.50 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.35 0.01 0.12
Occupation: self-employed 0.09 0.29 0.31 0.47 0.12 0.32 0.03 0.18 0.38 0.49 0.13 0.35 0.29 0.45 0.17 0.37 0.46 0.50 0.08 0.28 0.21 0.41 0.15 0.36
Self-reported economic status: good 0.22 0.42 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.17 0.05 0.22 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.16 0.04 0.19 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.32 0.15 0.35
Number of contacts at destination 2.09 2.21 1.05 1.57 3.46 2.68 4.44 2.85 1.87 1.75 1.45 1.54 3.00 2.08 2.35 1.96 2.08 1.89 3.17 2.32 2.29 2.22 2.24 2.04
Number of trips 1.74 0.88 1.32 0.92 1.71 1.07 1.43 1.00 1.47 0.78 1.22 0.54 1.34 0.61 1.45 0.80 1.37 0.66 1.26 0.47 1.32 0.66 1.45 0.96
Does not speak language of destination 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.35 0.05 0.22 0.67 0.47 0.77 0.43 0.68 0.47 0.59 0.49 0.60 0.49 0.53 0.50 0.73 0.44 0.53 0.50
Kids in Senegal 0.42 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.33 0.47 0.19 0.39 0.33 0.47 0.17 0.39 0.39 0.49 0.35 0.48 0.41 0.49 0.42 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.55 0.50
Spouse in Senegal 0.26 0.44 0.45 0.50 0.23 0.42 0.19 0.39 0.47 0.50 0.05 0.22 0.19 0.40 0.44 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.63 0.48















Table 1 Descriptive statistics for MAFE-Senegal sample, by destination and legal status (Continued)
Father's ed.: less than secondary school 0.64 0.48 0.74 0.44 0.65 0.48 0.62 0.49 0.78 0.42 0.88 0.34 0.77 0.42 0.82 0.38 0.80 0.40 0.75 0.44 0.67 0.47 0.72 0.45
Trip paid by family 0.38 0.49 0.28 0.45 0.52 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.27 0.44 0.13 0.34 0.50 0.50 0.27 0.44 0.25 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.42 0.49 0.31 0.46
Plan to stay: definitive 0.42 0.49 0.04 0.20 0.21 0.41 0.35 0.48 0.62 0.49 0.81 0.40 0.74 0.44 0.58 0.49 0.65 0.48 0.52 0.50 0.58 0.49 0.65 0.48
Trip motivation: work/better life 0.46 0.50 0.73 0.45 0.41 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.73 0.44 0.79 0.42 0.18 0.38 0.68 0.47 0.80 0.40 0.79 0.41 0.48 0.50 0.91 0.28
At least one parent alive in Senegal 0.91 0.28 0.88 0.33 0.93 0.26 0.75 0.44 0.89 0.31 0.95 0.23 0.86 0.34 0.81 0.40 0.74 0.44 0.93 0.25 0.81 0.40 0.81 0.39
Legal status mean sd mean sd mean sd
Fully irregular 0.13 0.34 0.26 0.44 0.21 0.4
Mixed (no RP) 0.031 0.17 0.027 0.16 0.063 0.24
Mixed (no WP) 0.1 0.3 0.055 0.23 0.12 0.33
Fully regular 0.74 0.44 0.65 0.48 0.61 0.49
N (person-years) 3677 2098 2413
N (trips) 768















authorization (RP_NWP) are less likely than migrants with either fully regular status or
work-only authorization to make visits to the homeland. This indicates that a residence
permit in and of itself, which should grant the legal ability to circulate, is not sufficient
for successful circulation.
Overall, irregular legal status seems to constrain remitting less than short returns: the
proportion of Senegalese migrants who remit is never under 50 %, whatever the desti-
nations and legal-status categories (Table 1). Still, migrants with fully regular legal sta-
tus are more likely to remit than migrants with fully irregular legal status. In addition,
in most cases, migrants with fully regular status are also more likely to participate in
this activity than migrants with mixed statuses. This general pattern holds across
destinations.
The descriptive evidence supports the hypothesis that those migrants who make
short returns home have a higher propensity to engage in non-mobile transnational ac-
tivities and of an indirect effect of territorial confinement on remitting via the inhib-
ition of short returns. Figure 2 shows the variation in transnational activities
conditional on both short returns and legal status. Variation in non-mobile trans-
national activities by cross-border mobility is evident: migrants who circulate are more
likely to remit. In addition, this figure shows that legal status can operate through short
returns to constrain non-mobile transnational activities: migrants who lack secure legal






















Fully regular Mixed (no WP) Mixed (no RP) Fully irregular
Legal status
Italy
Short return No short return
Fig. 2 Proportion remitting by destination and legal status
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Multivariate results
Hypothesis 1: territorial confinement
Multivariate analyses indicate that the association between legal status and visiting the
homeland is robust. Model I of Table 2 shows the results of the random-intercept logis-
tic regression of yearly reports of short returns for the pooled cross-national sample.
Compared to migrants with fully regular (RP_WP) status, those migrants with fully ir-
regular or mixed statuses are statistically significantly less likely to circulate. Senegalese
migrants with fully irregular (NRP_NWP) status are 22 percentage points less likely to
report a visit to Senegal in any given year than migrants with fully regular (RP_WP)
status. This translates into a subject-specific predicted probability of circulation for mi-
grants with fully irregular status of 3 %, while those migrants with both residence and
work authorization have a subject-specific predicted probability of about 25 %. Having
fully regular status is thus associated with a seven-fold increase in the probability of
making a visit home compared to having fully irregular status. Senegalese migrants
who lack any kind of legal authorization have little chance of visiting the homeland be-
cause they are largely confined to the territory of the countries in which they reside.
Furthermore, Models II through IV of Table 2 show that the negative effect of fully ir-
regular status is, ceteris paribus, very consistent across the three destinations. Despite
different immigration-policy contexts, then, a complete lack of legal authorization
firmly constrains migrants’ ability to travel home.
Table 2 also indicates that migrants with semi-irregular or mixed statuses are also less
likely than migrants with fully regular status to circulate between destination and origin.
Lacking only a residence permit (NRP_WP) is associated with a 14-percentage-point gap
in the probability of visiting the homeland compared to migrants with fully regular status,
while lacking only a work permit (RP_NWP) is associated with an 8-point gap. Country-
specific models (II through IV) show, however, that these effects are mostly concentrated
among migrants in France: mixed statuses have less effect on short returns of Senegalese
migrants living in Spain and Italy. On the other hand, conditions of entry have a more
powerful impact in these countries, where having entered without a visa is negatively as-
sociated with short returns (models III and IV). Migrants who were irregular upon
entry—a status more common in Italy and Spain than in France (see Table 1)—are likely
wary of the costs of another potentially undocumented border crossing.
These multivariate results thus support the hypothesis of territorial confinement:
Senegalese migrants who lack one or both forms of authorization are significantly less
likely to engage in short returns to Senegal, and this effect is constant across destina-
tions. The legal reality that creates these irregular statuses thus functions as an import-
ant constraint on this physical, mobile form of cross-border action across disparate
immigration-policy regimes.
Hypothesis 2: structural exclusion and blocked transnationalism
Blocked transnationalism/structural exclusion was evident in the descriptive results:
Senegalese migrants with fully regular (RP_WP) status were the most likely to engage
in the non-mobile transnational activity of remitting, while migrants with fully or semi-
irregular statuses were less likely to participate in this activity (Table 1). This blockage
as a result of lack of secure legal status is also evident in the multivariate results of
Table 3. Model I of Table 3 shows the results of the random-intercept logistic
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Table 2 Multivariate results for random-intercept regression models of short returns
Predictor I. Pooled II. France III. Spain IV. Italy
AME se AME se AME se AME se
Legal status (ref: fully regular:
RP_WP)
Fully irregular (NRP_NWP) −0.22*** 0.016 −0.25*** 0.028 −0.21*** 0.023 −0.20*** 0.031
Mixed (NRP_WP) −0.14*** 0.027 −0.20*** 0.038 0.11 0.14 −0.11* 0.042
Mixed (RP_NWP) −0.077*** 0.023 −0.13*** 0.033 −0.038 0.048 0.013 0.049
Destination (ref: France)
Spain 0.0089 0.037 - - - - - -
Italy −0.038 0.034 - - - - - -
Entry status: no visa (ref: visa) −0.01 0.02 0.039 0.034 −0.060+ 0.035 −0.096* 0.040
Years in destination 0.0099*** 0.0013 0.010*** 0.0019 0.014*** 0.0024 0.010*** 0.0024
Period of arrival: post-1990
(ref: pre-1990)
0.032 0.029 0.017 0.046 −0.030 0.054 0.011 0.071
Age at start of current migration
spell
−0.00029 0.002 0.000082 0.0032 −0.0011 0.0026 −0.00021 0.0046
Sex: Male (ref: female) 0.01 0.031 −0.035 0.051 −0.0081 0.046 0.051 0.063
Years of education 0.0058* 0.0025 0.012** 0.0042 0.00091 0.0035 0.0016 0.0060
Ethnicity: Wolof (ref.: other) 0.034 0.029 −0.018 0.052 0.12** 0.039 0.043 0.056
Religion: Mouride (ref.: other) 0.047 0.032 0.042 0.067 0.038 0.042 0.030 0.052
Economic activity (ref.: unemployed)
Employed 0.036 0.031 −0.065 0.058 0.18*** 0.042 0.053 0.053
Inactive 0.0029 0.035 −0.084 0.062 0.14** 0.054 −0.069 0.065
Occupation: self-employed
(ref.: other)
−0.018 0.024 0.022 0.076 0.015 0.037 −0.045 0.036
Self-reported econ. status: good
(ref.: bad)
0.041 0.035 −0.075 0.047 −0.088 0.099 0.11* 0.053
Number of contacts at destination 0.0011 0.004 −0.0054 0.0060 −0.011 0.0079 0.014 0.0094
Number of trips 0.009 0.012 0.022 0.017 −0.015 0.024 −0.019 0.032
Does not speak language of
destination
−0.022 0.029 0.057 0.12 −0.099** 0.036 0.0017 0.051
Kids in Senegal (ref.: no) −0.0018 0.019 −0.038 0.035 0.045 0.035 0.014 0.031
Spouse in Senegal (ref.: no) 0.15*** 0.026 0.082+ 0.047 0.073+ 0.040 0.22*** 0.041
Geographic origin: from Dakar
(ref.: other)
0.021 0.028 −0.0096 0.049 −0.045 0.038 0.095+ 0.051
Father's ed.: < secondary school
(ref.: more)
−0.016 0.029 0.023 0.047 −0.0019 0.043 −0.034 0.056
Trip paid by family (ref.: no) −0.013 0.027 −0.027 0.045 −0.037 0.044 0.0082 0.055
Plan to stay: definitive (ref.: no) −0.01 0.025 0.011 0.046 −0.0018 0.036 −0.014 0.050
Trip motivation: work/better
life (ref.: other)
−0.0044 0.025 0.018 0.046 0.0041 0.037 −0.024 0.061
At least one parent alive in Sn.
(ref.: no)
−0.053* 0.022 −0.014 0.032 −0.058 0.038 −0.054 0.045
Log likelihood −3411.38 −1608.37 −883.35 −851.44
ρ (latent) 0.51 0.507 0.317 0.637
Pearson's r (manifest) 0.3 0.347 0.192 0.431
Observations (person-years) 8119 3676 2089 2354
Source: MAFE-Senegal. Notes: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Average marginal effects (AMEs) calculated
with individual-specific intercept assumed at mean of distribution of random intercepts. Pearson’s r evaluated at median
linear predictor
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Table 3 Multivariate results for random-intercept regression models of remittances
Predictor I. Pooled II. France III. Spain IV. Italy
AME se AME se AME se AME se
Short return (ref.: none) 0.060*** 0.011 0.055** 0.018 0.026 0.016 0.10*** 0.026
Legal status (ref: fully regular:
RP_WP)
Fully irregular (NRP_NWP) −0.11*** 0.021 0.017 0.030 −0.11** 0.035 −0.045 0.027
Mixed (NRP_WP) 0.056* 0.026 0.13*** 0.038 −0.026 0.073 0.039 0.030
Mixed (RP_NWP) −0.03 0.02 −0.047 0.034 −0.033 0.031 0.013 0.033
Destination (ref: France)
Spain 0.012 0.042 - - - - - -
Italy −0.036 0.048 - - - - - -
Entry status: no visa (ref: visa) −0.034+ 0.02 −0.000041 0.027 −0.18** 0.063 0.010 0.045
Years in destination 0.022*** 0.002 0.018*** 0.0027 0.028*** 0.0055 0.026*** 0.0043
Period of arrival: post-1990
(ref: pre-1990)
−0.015 0.038 0.052 0.054 −0.10+ 0.061 −0.045 0.086
Age at start of current migration
spell
0.0026 0.0025 −0.00035 0.0038 0.0025 0.0040 0.0045 0.0053
Sex: Male (ref: female) −0.029 0.04 −0.060 0.062 0.11 0.080 0.0083 0.071
Years of education −0.0066+ 0.0035 −0.013* 0.0056 −0.0066 0.0058 0.0040 0.0067
Ethnicity: Wolof (ref.: other) 0.0085 0.039 −0.054 0.073 0.052 0.062 −0.011 0.065
Religion: Mouride (ref.: other) 0.0022 0.041 0.037 0.074 0.080 0.062 −0.018 0.059
Economic activity (ref.:
unemployed)
Employed 0.46*** 0.05 0.38*** 0.078 0.29*** 0.080 0.35*** 0.064
Inactive 0.098+ 0.053 −0.015 0.078 −0.034 0.095 0.26*** 0.075
Occupation: self-employed
(ref.: other)
−0.048+ 0.027 0.036 0.064 −0.097* 0.043 −0.012 0.029
Self-reported econ. status: good
(ref.: bad)
−0.026 0.034 −0.0036 0.060 −0.49* 0.20 −0.11** 0.042
Number of contacts at destination −0.0074+ 0.0038 −0.014** 0.0053 0.0045 0.0075 0.0055 0.010
Number of trips 0.072*** 0.017 0.12*** 0.034 −0.059 0.045 0.12** 0.046
Does not speak language of
destination
0.081* 0.035 −0.26 0.22 0.010 0.054 0.088 0.065
Kids in Senegal (ref.: no) 0.072*** 0.02 0.047 0.030 0.15*** 0.037 0.083* 0.036
Spouse in Senegal (ref.: no) 0.038+ 0.021 0.040 0.036 −0.015 0.031 0.063+ 0.035
Geographic origin: from Dakar
(ref.: other)
−0.037 0.038 −0.034 0.066 −0.053 0.064 −0.041 0.057
Father's ed.: < secondary school
(ref.: more)
−0.063+ 0.037 0.026 0.065 −0.058 0.059 −0.16** 0.052
Trip paid by family (ref.: no) −0.0051 0.038 0.092 0.062 −0.12 0.080 −0.052 0.066
Plan to stay: definitive (ref.: no) −0.099** 0.033 0.060 0.053 −0.061 0.053 −0.13* 0.057
Trip motivation: work/better life
(ref.: other)
0.14*** 0.035 0.013 0.049 0.031 0.061 0.34** 0.11
At least one parent alive in Sn.
(ref.: no)
0.12*** 0.024 0.15*** 0.036 0.26*** 0.051 −0.054 0.039
Log likelihood −1938.61 −907.774 −483.250 −425.263
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regression of yearly reports of remitting. Compared to migrants with fully regular
(RP_WP) status, those migrants with fully irregular (NRP_NWP) status are almost
eleven percentage points less likely to report remitting in any given year, whatever their
socio-economic status. Models II through IV show, however, that this effect is concen-
trated exclusively among migrants with irregular status in Spain. In addition to the
negative effect of yearly irregular status, the negative effect of having entered without a
visa that appears in the pooled model is also exclusively concentrated among migrants
in Spain. It is worth noting, however, that the predicted probability of remitting from
this country is still relatively high even for migrants with fully irregular status, indicat-
ing a near-universality of remitting among Senegalese migrants and an ability to cir-
cumvent formal barriers to these transfers.
The results thus show that the structural exclusion hypothesis is not fully sup-
ported: net of the socio-economic situation, legal status has no effect in France and
Italy and a moderate effect in the Spanish context. This could be explained by the fact
that migrants do not need to have the benefit of a legal status to be able to transfer
money in their home country: they can use their own social network (co-ethnics
bringing money home when they travel) or alternative services developed outside of
the bank system, which they can access whatever their legal status (Ezeoha, 2013;
Sarr, 2009). Furthermore, the insecurity associated with an irregular status may
encourage some migrants to remit: in contexts where the risk of deportation is high,
remitting is a way to insure that money earned abroad will remain accessible in case
of forced return (Pozo, 2005). These two arguments could explain the specificity of
the Spanish results: on the one hand, the higher percentage of migrants with irregular
status in this country (21 %, see Table 1) reduces the potential number of co-ethnics
able to travel home with remittances due to territorial confinement; on the other
hand, the relative tranquility of irregular migrants in Spain (Carnet, 2007; Tandian &
Bergh, 2014) compared to those subject to harsh policies in France and Italy (Finotelli
& Sciortino, 2009; Schain, 2008)—at least in some periods—may explain the finding
that irregular migrants are less prone to remit in Spain than in the two other
countries. In any case, the relationship between legal status and remitting is heavily
dependent on the context of reception.
Hypothesis 3: maintenance of social ties
The third hypothesis is that visits to the homeland will promote other forms of non-
mobile transnational engagement through the maintenance of social ties and the ability
to gather first-hand information. Model I in Table 3 displays the direct effects of short
visits to the homeland in the same year on remitting, net of the effects of other vari-
ables known to influence monetary transfers, such as family ties in the home country.
There is indeed a positive direct relationship between visiting home and remitting.
Table 3 Multivariate results for random-intercept regression models of remittances (Continued)
ρ (latent) 0.9 0.896 0.946 0.944
Pearson's r (manifest) 0.71 0.707 0.783 0.782
Observations (person-years) 8119 3676 2089 2354
Source: MAFE-Senegal. Notes: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Average marginal effects (AMEs) calculated
with individual-specific intercept assumed at mean of distribution of random intercepts. Pearson’s r evaluated at median
linear predictor
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Overall, returning to Senegal for a visit is associated with an increase of 6 percentage
points in the probability of remitting.
Other variables also indicate the importance of circulating between destination and
origin for ongoing non-mobile cross-border engagement. On one hand, the number of
trips (i.e. previous stays of at least one year in the same country) is highly predict-
ive of transnational engagement: each additional prior trip is associated with a 7.2
percentage-point increase in the probability of remitting. Repeat migration (ap-
proximately 30 % of the sample reported more than one trip) thus reinforces the
transnational social field in such a way as to make non-mobile transnational action
more likely for both individual and collective activities. On the other hand, migrants who
reported planning to stay definitively in the destination country (as reported by 46 % of
the sample) are 10 percentage points less likely to remit than those who do not plan to
stay definitively, indicating that remitting is integral to Senegalese migrants’ ability to pre-
pare an eventual return to Senegal. Migrants who reported having migrated principally
for work or in search of a better life are 14 percentage points more likely to remit, sug-
gesting that those migrants with motivations of accumulation are more likely to partici-
pate in financial cross-border action.
Overall, circulating—be it in the short or long term, retrospectively measured or
planned in the future—thus seems to create an incentive to remit. This result is in line
with research that finds that remitting is a financial decision that migrants make in
conjunction with their families (Stark, 1991): migrants decide whether to send money
to family in Senegal in response to personal and collective desires. Decisions to remit
are fundamentally about allocation of resources in an extended family unit and are thus
responsive to bonds of trust, emotion, and mutual obligation with the receivers of those
resources (Carling, 2008; Menjivar et al., 1998). Financial decisions are thus subject to
first-hand ties and the ability to gather information: as hypothesized, short visits to
Senegal allow migrants to strengthen social ties and gather information about the po-
tential uses of remittances via physical presence. Circulation over a longer term in the
form of multiple trips also predicts a higher probability to remit. These effects appear
very clearly in the pooled model, but they appear to be somewhat context dependent.
In particular, none of the circulation variables displays significant effects on remitting
among Senegalese migrants in Spain. We discuss further below the specificity of the re-
sults in the Spanish context.
Hypothesis 4: caging and indirect effects of legal status via short returns
While Table 3 displays the negative direct effects of irregular legal statuses and the posi-
tive direct effects of visits to the homeland on the remittances of Senegalese migrants,
these models do not allow testing of the hypothesis of an indirect effect of irregular sta-
tuses on remitting via territorial confinement (see Fig. 1 for the theoretical model). Table 4
presents results from the non-linear decomposition of total effects using the KHB method
and shows the direct, indirect, and total effects5 of irregular legal statuses on remitting.
Results from the pooled model indicate an overall significant negative effect of fully
irregular status on remitting, a global effect that can be decomposed into direct and
indirect effects. The direct effect corresponds to the structural exclusion hypothesis and
explains 86 % of the total negative effect of the fully irregular legal status (NRP_NWP).
The indirect effect, via the mediator of reduced short returns, explains 14 % of the total
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negative effect of the same status when the three destination countries are considered to-
gether. Results vary substantially, however, across destinations. Although observed in the
three contexts, the negative effect of a fully irregular status on remitting is much stronger
(more significant and with a higher coefficient) in Spain and Italy than in France. Mecha-
nisms behind this negative effect also differ by destination. In Spain, the negative associ-
ation between fully irregular status and remitting is fully captured by the direct effect, or
the structural exclusion hypothesis discussed above. On the contrary, in France and Italy,
the negative effect of a fully irregular status is mostly indirect due to the mechanism of
lesser direct contacts through reduced visits to Senegal. The lack of ability to maintain
and reinforce these social ties translates into reduced remitting. Irregular status serves to
confine migrants to the territory of the destination and, and thus cages their non-mobile
transnational engagement in France and Italy. The KHB method thus provides evidence
to support the hypothesis of an indirect effect of territorial confinement on remitting, but
only in select contexts of reception.
Discussion: legal status, national context and remittances
Figure 3 provides a synthetic view of the results produced with logit models and with
the KHB decomposition. It allows a clear view of how the relationships between legal
status and mobile and non-mobile transnational practices vary according to the destin-
ation context.
The straightforward confirmation of the territorial confinement hypothesis is the first
important result (see Fig. 3, col. A). The results unambiguously show that Senegalese
migrants with a fully irregular status are significantly less likely to make short returns
to the homeland. Insecure legal statuses impose a direct constraint on migrants’
Table 4 KHB decomposition of effects of legal status categories on remitting via short returns
Legal status
(ref: fully regular

















Pooled Fully irregular −2.122*** −1.828*** −0.293*** 1.16 13.81 % 0.16
Mixed (no RP) 0.817+ 0.985** −0.169*** 0.83 −20.69 % −0.17
Mixed (no WP) −0.725** −0.584* −0.141** 1.24 19.45 % 0.24
No visa at entry −0.39 −0.39 −0.0043 1.00 1.10 % 0.01
France Fully irregular −0.63+ −0.34 −0.30*** 1.85 48 % 0.88
Mixed (no RP) 2.07** 2.31*** −0.23** 0.90 −11 % −0.10
Mixed (no WP) −0.81* −0.63+ −0.19** 1.29 23 % 0.30
No visa at entry 0.49 0.44 0.048 1.11 10 % 0.11
Spain Fully irregular −3.46*** −3.32*** −0.14 1.04 4 % 0.04
Mixed (no RP) −1.16 −1.20 0.040 0.97 −3 % −0.03
Mixed (no WP) −1.10* −1.06+ −0.04 1.04 4 % 0.04
No visa at entry −3.14*** −3.11*** −0.02 1.01 1 % 0.01
Italy Fully irregular −3.19*** −2.54*** −0.65*** 1.26 20 % 0.26
Mixed (no RP) −0.08 0.20 −0.28 −0.40 350 % −1.40
Mixed (no WP) −0.95 −0.77 −0.19 1.23 20 % 0.25
No visa at entry −0.27 −0.15 −0.12 1.80 44 % 0.80
Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1; logit coefficients displayed. KHB method. All models control for
variables listed in Table 3
Source: MAFE-Senegal
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physical mobility. As expected, migrants are at the mercy of state immigration-control
mechanisms for their ability to make trips back to the homeland.
As visits to the home country are considered to be instrumental for migrants to
maintain social links and collect accurate information on the uses of the remittances
they send, we hypothesized that an irregular legal status not only directly affects the
ability to travel back and forth, but is also indirectly related to the propensity to engage
in non-mobile transnational activities, such as remitting, through constraints on circu-
lation and thus also on the co-presence important for the maintenance of social ties.
The results confirm this theoretical expectation only partially. On one hand, the idea
Fig. 3 Summary of results
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that visits augment the propensity to remit is not observed in all contexts: while it is
confirmed in Italy and France, there is no significant relationship between short returns
and remitting in Spain (Fig. 3, col. A). On the other hand, when the expected relation-
ship between short returns and remitting is evident, the KHB decomposition confirms
a significant indirect effect of a fully irregular status on the probability to remit (Fig. 3,
col. B, Italy and France).
How to explain that this mechanism is not at play in the Spanish context? Why do
visits to the homeland not transform into more active remitting behaviors among mi-
grants living in this country? A possible explanation reverts to differences in the initial
selection of migrants by destination: it might be that, from the onset (i.e., the decision
to out-migrate), migrants heading to Spain are driven by more individualistic motiva-
tions and less prone to support family members left behind in Senegal. To put it
shortly, Senegalese migrants to Spain could be “adventurers” more commonly than in
Italy, and especially more than in France, where settlement patterns have long been fo-
cused on family reunification. This can be exemplified by the popularization of the
motto “Barsa wala Barsakh”—a Wolof phrase meaning “Barcelona or Die”—among
Senegalese youth (Mbaye, 2014). Senegalese migrants in Spain may also be less
enmeshed in social structures that encourage migrants to support families and commu-
nities in Senegal. In France, where the Senegalese community has been well established
since the 1970s, hometown associations exert a strong social pressure on migrants to
encourage them to keep financial connections with origin families and communities
(Chort, Gubert, & Senne, 2012). In Italy, Murid organizations play an important role to
remind migrants their social and economic obligations towards their home country
(Kaag, 2008; Riccio, 2001). In contrast, the Senegalese community is much more recent
in Spain than in France (Beauchemin, Sakho, Schoumaker, & Flahaux, 2014) and,
although there is no comparative measure of the social pressure exerted at destination
by migrants organizations, it may be lesser in Spain than in the two other countries
partly because of the recency of these organizations and the relative diffusion of
Senegalese migrants in rural areas of Spain (Sow, 2005). The professional profiles of
Senegalese migrants that stem from this selection may also play a role in limiting the
relationship between returns and remitting. Senegalese in Spain are more likely to be
concentrated in economic sectors that are not linked to circulation, such as agriculture
and construction, while Senegalese in Italy are more likely to be independent entrepre-
neurs whose livelihoods depend on circulating between Italy and Senegal for commer-
cial purposes.
The absence of relationship between mobile transnationalism (visits to Senegal) and
non-mobile transnational engagement (remitting) is not the only specificity of the
Spanish case. Compared to France and Italy, Spain also stands out by the fact that this
is the only country where the structural exclusion hypothesis is confirmed (i.e. where
irregular migrants are significantly less likely to remit than migrants with full right to
stay and work), and where the negative effect of the legal status is almost totally
absorbed by this direct effect (see horizontal arrows in Fig. 3, col. A and B).
How to explain that the structural exclusion/blocked transnationalism hypothesis is
not confirmed in the other countries? Several mechanisms may be at play. As the
migrants’ economic situation is controlled for in the models, we discard here the idea
that a lesser economic precarity of irregular migrants in France or Italy would explain
Vickstrom and Beauchemin Comparative Migration Studies  (2016) 4:15 Page 23 of 29
that the structural exclusion effect is not observed there. Initial selection into migration to
one destination or the other may again play a role: irregular migrants to Spain could be
selected among the most individualistic persons, while the other destinations would be
preferred by more collective-oriented migrants as a possible result of different sorts of
migration networks. Another mechanism is related to the practical and institutional
possibilities to remit for irregular migrants. If they cannot access banks for formal trans-
fers, they usually rely on their co-ethnics to transfer money: relatives or friends are asked
to bring money back home when they return or entire informal money-transfer services
exist as complements to other commercial activities (Sarr, 2009). Such a mechanism
requires that irregular migrants have people able to travel on whom they can rely, or
established commercial networks linking entrepreneurs in the destination country to
counterparts in Senegal. This is certainly more the case in France or Italy, where irregular
migrants are proportionally less numerous and migrant organizations more established
(Chort et al., 2012), and where irregular migrants have thus a more stable social and
economic infrastructure to organize their informal transfers. A third mechanism could be
related to the policy pressure exerted by governments on irregular migrants. Compared to
migrants with irregular status in France and Spain, who face harsh deportation policies
(Finotelli & Sciortino, 2009; Schain, 2008), irregular migrants in Spain have lived under a
more tolerant policy regime where regularizations are common and even migrants in
irregular status have access to health services, education, and public housing (Tandian &
Bergh, 2014; Van Nieuwenhuyze, 2008). Senegalese in Spain face a lower risk of
deportation than Senegalese in France and Italy, and may thus be less likely to engage in
remitting as insurance policy against forced return (Pozo, 2005).
Conclusion
We have shown in this study that migrants who have irregular status may face three
kinds of legal constraints on their cross-border actions: a direct legal constraint on
their physical mobility, limiting short returns to the homeland; a direct legal constraint
on their formal institutional participation, limiting their remitting; and an indirect legal
constraint on their remitting through their inability to visit home and the concomitant
curtailing of social ties. Previous studies of transnational activities, in overlooking the
relationship between visits home and non-mobile transnational activities, have thus
neglected an important mechanism for the constraint that legal status may have on
cross-border action.
We have shown some variations across countries in patterns of direct and indirect ef-
fects, especially on remitting. France and Spain appear as opposite models as for the re-
lationships between legal status, mobile and non-mobile transnational practices. In the
former country, legal status has predominantly an indirect effect on remitting, through
the mediation of visits to Senegal. These irregular migrants have a lower probability of
remitting because they are trapped at destination and limited in their ability to main-
tain social connections at origin. On the contrary, in Spain, the effect of the legal status
is predominantly direct and has almost nothing to do with the ability to move back and
forth between origin and destination. Factors explaining these differences are multiple
and revert to various elements of context of reception, such as: the policy treatment of
irregular migrants (from tolerance to deportation), the social infrastructure at destin-
ation (with migrant organizations encouraging and facilitating money transfers), the
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initial selection of migrants towards one destination or another. Future research would
need to examine more carefully these potential factors of national differences. In any
case, whatever the destination context, the lack of a secure status creates a situation of
territorial confinement.
This study takes up Levitt’s (Levitt, 2015, p. 2284) challenge to examine the “how,
why, and where” of the persistence or dissipation of transnational activities. In finding
nuanced relationships between the legal status of Senegalese migrants and a subset of
their transnational activities, we have sought to demonstrate that different types of
cross-border engagement are sensitive not only to the characteristics of the migrants
and their homeland communities, but also to the legal constraints that they face in
their contexts of reception. By considering Senegalese migrants in three distinct con-
texts of reception, this study heeds the call (Levitt, 2015) to extend the concepts of ter-
ritorial confinement and caging (Waldinger, 2008, 2015) beyond the Mexico-US
migration system. We have used an empirical case that offers the advantage of harmo-
nized data across multiple destination countries, which has allowed us to extend
Waldinger’s (2008, 2015) territorial-confinement hypothesis by demonstrating that not
all transnational activities in all destinations are equally sensitive to the legal constraint
of irregular status. While there is an unambiguous negative effect of irregular status on
visits home, both the direct and indirect effects of irregular status on remittances de-
pend on other social and economic facets of the co-ethnic community and the context
of reception.
While this study contributes to the literature on transnational activities, its findings
are subject to limitations. The largest of these are related to the data: while innovative
and rich, the MAFE data are limited by sampling strategy, sample size, and measure-
ment strategies. In most of the European countries (with the exception of Spain), no
sampling frame was available. The samples constructed on the basis of quota methods
may not be representative of Senegalese migrants in each country (e.g., they might
over-represent migrants well-connected to the co-ethnic community). Furthermore, the
national samples were relatively small, thus any empirical results could suffer from lack
of precision. The survey’s measurement strategy ensured comparable variables across
national contexts, which allowed comparative analysis, and over time, but the retro-
spective data are potentially limited by recall bias and many variables remained un-
measured. Variables important for this study that were not measured include mode and
frequency of communication with family and friends in Senegal, method of remittance
sending, and measures of strength of social ties with family. Future research should
seek to address these gaps.
Our findings have implication for policies of immigration control, immigrant integra-
tion, and co-development. Modern nation-states place contradictory demands on
migrant’s cross-border activities. On the one hand, many destination-country govern-
ments have started to recognize the role that migrants can and do play in the develop-
ment of their homelands and have put in place “co-development” schemes (Kabbanji,
2013; Weil, 2002) to leverage transnational activities for the benefit of development
programs. On the other hand, states have erected increasingly restrictive immigration-
control apparatuses that make it difficult to acquire secure legal status. This difficulty
translates into a captured loyalty among legal migrants, who have invested heavily in
their membership, and a physical territorial confinement of those migrants who lack
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regular status. The immigration-control control apparatus, coupled with a dominant
ideology of assimilation that often looks askance at foreign loyalties, thus implicitly
limits the cross-border activities of both documented and undocumented migrants.
At the same time, the robustness of the social infrastructure of most transnational ac-
tivities indicates that irregularity of legal status may constrain but does not completely
determine cross-border action. While the state and formal institutions may demand
“papers” for the crossing of some kinds of borders, migrants clearly find ways to cir-
cumvent these demands; this study showed that even migrants completely bereft of
residence and work authorization have a non-zero probability of crossing the destin-
ation state’s geographical border for a short visit to Senegal. At the same time, we have
shown the importance of taking legal status into account as transnational activities are
subject to a number of legal constraints, both direct and indirect.
This study does lend credence, however, to the idea that the homeland and its values
remain important arbiters social status for Senegalese migrants (Kaag, 2008; Kane,
2011; Riccio, 2008). There are strong effects of short visits, social ties, repeat migration,
plans to return, and work-related motivation on non-mobile transnational activities.
This shows that Senegalese migrants’ cross-border engagement is largely motivated by
a desire to return to Senegal eventually. A logic of accumulation at origin may thus
dominate a logic of integration at destination (Van Nieuwenhuyze, 2008); both of these
logics, however, are potentially blocked by lack of secure legal status: migrants without
“papers” are both directly blocked from transnational participation via legal exclusion
from border crossing, and indirectly blocked by physical caging in the destination and
the concomitant withering of social ties. Legal status is thus of key importance in
keeping open the door to returns to the homeland.
Endnotes
1See http://mafeproject.site.ined.fr/ for more information on the MAFE project.
2https://www.service-public.fr/particuliers/vosdroits/F2741
3This metric is “reset” for each subsequent stay in a different destination; the models
include a quadratic term on years in destination to account for potential non-linearities
in its effect
4All time-varying predictors are observed at time t. All models were also estimated
with lagged predictors measured at time t – 1 but results (not reported, available upon
request) were substantively similar.
5The effects are presented as logit coefficients (log-odds) so are not directly compar-
able to the quantities in the random-intercept models.
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